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Executive Loans From 
Corporate Funds 
Jayne W. Barnard* 
The author surveys the laws affecting loans made by a 
corporation to its executives, including the state loan en-
abling statutes, the applicable tax laws, and any disclosure 
requirements. Also discussed is the applicability of Regula-
tion G to loans made by a corporation to facilitate share 
purchases by its executives. Finally, the author enumerates 
the risks inherent in executive lending and makes sugges-
tions for risk minimization. 
Since commentators last addressed the topic of executive 
loans,' the state laws, tax law, securities law, and banking law 
applicable to the subject have changed appreciably. While 
corporate loans to officers and directors used to be disfavored, if 
not absolutely prohibited by most state laws, 2 today, the majori-
ty of the states permit such loans through enabling provisions 
modeled generally on the Delaware General Corporation Law 3 
* Member, Illinois and Virginia Bars, and Associate Professor, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. She 
was assisted in the preparation of this article by Catherine S. Wooledge, a 
third-year law student at William & Mary. 
1
 Rich, "Corporate Loans to Officers, Directors and Shareholders," 14 Bus. 
Law. 658 (1959); Mann, "Moral and Ethical Problems; Loans to Management 
and Compensation Problems," 31 Bus. Law. 1305 (1976). 
2 See generally Barnard, "Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers—
Every Business Now a Bank?" 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 237 nn. 1-4, 17-24, and 
accompanying text. 
3 The Delaware statute provides: 
Any corporation may lend money to, or guarantee any obligation of, or 
otherwise assist any officer or other employee of the corporation or of its 
subsidiary, including any officer or employee who is a director of the 
corporation or its subsidiary, whenever, in the judgment of the directors, 
such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the 
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or the Model Business Corporation Act. 4 While federal tax treat-
ment of executive loans until recently encouraged liberal use of 
such loans in lieu of compensation, the case today is precisely 
the opposite. 5 Federal and (some) state financial disclosure re-
quirements now mandate disclosure to shareholders of loans to 
executives and members of their families. 6 Loans made for the 
purpose of facilitating executive stock purchases may be gov-
erned by the margin rules contained in Regulation G. 7 
State Law 
The primary source of authority on the propriety of executive 
loans from corporate funds is the law of the incorporating state. 
corporation. The loan, guaranty or other assistance may be with or without 
interest, and may be unsecured, or secured in such manner as the board of 
directors shall approve, including, without limitation, a pledge of shares of 
stock of the corporation. . . . 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). 
4 The Model Business Corporation Act provides: 
A corporation shall not lend money to or use its credit to assist its direc-
tors without authorization in the particular case by its shareholders, but may 
lend money to and use its credit to assist any employee of the corporation or 
of a subsidiary, including any such employee who is a director of the 
corporation, if the board of directors decides that such loan or assistance 
may benefit the corporation. 
Model Business Corporation Act § 47 (1969). This provision was later amended 
both in substance and in form to provide: 
[A] [The] corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation 
of a director of the corporation unless: 
(1) the particular loan or guarantee is approved by a majority of the 
votes represented by the outstanding voting shares of all classes, voting as 
a single voting group, except the votes of shares owned by or voted under 
the control of the benefited director; or 
(2) the corporation's board of directors determines that the loan or 
guarantee benefits the corporation and either approves the specific loan or 
guarantee or a general plan authorizing loans and guarantees. 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.32 (1984). This formulation was 
not adopted by any state and has since been deleted from the Model Act. 
5 See notes 34-45 infra and accompanying text. 
6 See notes 58-64 infra and accompanying text. 
7 See notes 66-79 infra and accompanying text. 
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Forty-five states currently include within their business corpora-
tion statutes express provisions relating to executive loans. Of 
these, only two prohibit such loans 8 while the rest variously 
define the circumstances and standards under which executive 
loans may be authorized. 
The most common format is an enabling provision permitting 
executive loans to be authorized by the board of directors where 
the board finds that granting the loan may reasonably be ex-
pected to benefit the corporation." 9 Seven "restrictive" states 
8 D.C. Code Ann. § 29-304(6) (1981) (loans to officers and directors ex-
pressly excluded from enumeration of corporate powers); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 21-2045 (1983) (prohibits loans to officers and directors and loans secured by 
its shares). Arkansas corporations incorporated before December 31, 1987, and 
not electing coverage under the new Corporations Act are not authorized to 
make loans to officers, directors, or 10 percent shareholders. Ark. Stat. Ann. 
4-26-204. 4-27-1701 (1987 and Supp. 1987). 
Several states, while not expressly prohibiting executive loans, presum-
ably discourage them by imposing personal liability on directors who approve 
such loans. E.g.. Cal. Corp. Code § 316 (West Supp. 1988): Colo. Rev. Stat. 
7-5-114 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-321(c) (West 1987); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 62 (West Supp. 1987); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
450.1551(1)(d) (West 1973); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.165 (Vernon Supp. 1987); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-11 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 719(4) 
(McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-32(f)D (1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 1701.95 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-170(c) (Law. 
Co-op. 1987); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 47-5-18 (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10-44(d) (1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23A.08.450(2) (Supp. 1987); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 180.40(1)(d) (West 1957). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8. § 143 (1983); see also Ala. Code § 10-2A-69 (1987); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-047 (1977); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 4-27-832 (Supp. 1987) 
(applicable to corporations incorporated after December 31, 1987): Cal. Corp. 
Code § 315 (West Supp. 1988) (applies only to corporations with 100 or more 
shareholders that have adopted a charter provision authorizing board approval 
and also applies only to loans to officers, not directors); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
607.141 (West Supp. 1987); Idaho Code § 30-1-47 (1980); Ind. Code Ann. 
23-1-35-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.4.6 (West Supp. 
1987); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6303 (1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.235 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 2-416 (1985); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1548 (West 1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.501 
(West 1985); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-1415 (1987); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-
A:47 (Supp. 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-11 (West Supp. 1986) (also re-
quires, in the case of loans to directors, that they be made pursuant to a provi-
sion in the certificate of incorporation, bylaws approved by the shareholders or 
a plan adopted by the shareholders); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-89 (1985); 
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require shareholder approval of some or all" executive loans, 
and six "liberal" states expressly permit the extension of execu-
tive loans with no statutory limitations.1 2 Two other states au-
thorize corporate lending generally with no discussion of execu-
tive loans specifically. 13 
The common ancestor of the "benefit" statutes is Section 143 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 14 enacted in 1967. 15 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1029 (West 1986): Or. Bus. Corp. Act. ch. 52, 1987 
Or. Laws § 87; R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-42 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-170 
(Law Co-op. 1987): S.D. Codified Laws § 47-2-65 (1983); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 48-18-303 (Supp. 1987): Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23A.08.445 (Supp. 1987); 
W. Va. Code § 31-1-101 (1988); Wyo. Stat. § 17-1-140.1 (Supp. 1987). 
Georgia requires director approval for executive loans but imposes no "ben-
efit" requirement. Ga. Code Ann. § 14-5-5 (1982). Texas imposes a benefit 
requirement but fails to specify director approval. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 
art. 2.02A(6) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Massachusetts absolves authorizing direc-
tors of personal liability for unrepaid loans where they have approved or 
ratified it based upon a finding of corporate "benefit." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 156B.§ 62 (West Supp. 1987). Connecticut absolves its directors where the 
loan was made "primarily for a legitimate business purpose of the corpora-
tion." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-321(c) (West 1987). 
10 Alaska Stat. § 10.06.485 (1989) (loans to directors—including inside di-
rectors—require approval of two thirds of the voting shares); Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 315 (West Supp. 1987) (corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders re-
quire shareholder approval of loans to directors or officers); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 7-3-101(1)(f) (1986) (requires affirmative two-thirds vote of shareholders to 
authorize a loan to a director, unless articles of incorporation dictate other-
wise); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-11 (West Supp. 1986) (loans to directors are 
limited to those granted pursuant to employee benefit plans adopted by the 
shareholders or reflected in the certificate of incorporation or bylaw adopted by 
the shareholders); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 714 (McKinney 1986) (any loan to a 
director must be approved by the shareholders). 
11 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-22 (1983) (any loan to a director, officer, or dominant 
shareholder must be approved by the shareholders); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10- 
43 (1987) (loans to directors or officers require shareholder consent). 
12 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 416-26(7) (1985); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, ¶ 3.10(f) (Smith-
Hurd 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 202(1)(M) (1981); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 79-4-3.02(11) (Supp. 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-4(F) (1983); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 1852(6) (1984). 
13 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1302(9) (Purdon Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 13.1-627 (1985). 
14 See note 3 supra. 
15 This provision was regarded as a "financial plum" for managers. Com-
ment, "Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967," 117 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 873 (1969). Prof. Ernest Folk, who served as reporter for 
the 1967 revision, later commented that, even though he regarded himself as 
"pro-management," he thought the loan enabling provision of § 143 was 
"overly liberal. – Id. at 865, 874 n. 102. 
19891 EXECUTIVE LOANS FROM CORPORATE FUNDS 
	
261 
Reconstruction of the legislative history of Section 143 suggests 
that it was adopted initially as a means to accommodate the tem-
porary needs of "salaried officers and officer-directors who 
[were] being moved about the country with greater frequency 
and often upon short notice by management. . . ." 18 The per-
ceived need for this provision derived from the notion that 
corporate executives served effectively as "trustees" and—
notwithstanding the availability of advances or loans to 
nonexecutive employees faced with comparable demands—
could not accept loans absent express statutory authorization." 
Other states quickly followed Delaware's lead, and it was not 
long before the common understanding of the scope of executive 
lending authority was substantially broadened. Just two years 
after the enactment of Section 143, the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act was amended to authorize executive loans," with the 
attendant commentary observing: 
Contemporary business requirements of moving officers from 
one place to another, the development of stock purchase 
plans, and other ways of creating financial needs, justify the 
making of loans to officers in many cases." 
By the time Minnesota adopted a loan enabling provision in 
1981, the statutory commentary observed: 
['Ole power of the corporation to loan money to those persons 
or businesses connected with the corporation is a useful tool 
16 Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 690 P.2d 1343, 1349 
(1984). quoting from the legislative commentary on adoption of Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 17-6303 (1972). 
17 See generally Barnard, note 2 supra, at n. 19 and accompanying text. The 
practical need to make such loans can easily be satisfied in most cases without 
the cumbersome requirements of most loan enabling statutes. For example, 
two states, Minnesota and North Dakota, have chosen this simple approach: 
"A corporation may, without a vote of the directors, advance money to its 
directors, officers, or employees to cover expenses that can reasonably be an-
ticipated to be incurred by them in the performance of their duties and for 
which they would be entitled to reimbursement in the absence of an advance." 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301A.505 (West 1985); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-90 
(1985). 
18 See note 4 supra. 
19 Scott, "Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act," 24 Bus. Law. 
291, 292 (1968). 
262 	 SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 17 : 257 
for the protection of the economic interest of that corporation 
and a useful incentive with which to attract top management 
or assure future growth. 
* * * 
[T]he loan or guaranty can be a valuable factor in the retention 
of experienced management or the hiring of promising per-
sonnel. The board may make these loans for any purpose, as 
long as it reasonably expects the corporation to directly or 
indirectly benefit from the transaction through better perform-
ance by current employees or better personnel. 20  
Few cases have directly tested the scope of the "benefit" 
statutes. 21 Many have explored the consequences of executive 
loans improvidently made. 22 
2° Reporter's Notes to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.501 (West 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
21 Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d at 1348 (unsecured and non-
interest-bearing loans to the president and dominant shareholder of a closed 
corporation held to violate the Kansas "benefit" statute where the company 
itself was indebted (and paying interest on its debts) at the time it made the 
loans and where — [the borrower's] purpose was not the welfare of Barnes In-
vestment and its other stockholders but his own personal benefit"); Roxbury 
State Bank v. The Clarendon, 324 A.2d 24, 34 (App. Div. 1974) (mortgage 
secured by a bank loan to a corporation, with bank's knowledge of the promot-
ers' intent to divert a portion of the proceeds to unrelated business ventures, is 
invalid and cannot be foreclosed; court refuses to treat the diverted funds as a 
"loan" by the corporate borrower where there is "no basis for a finding that 
the corporation, as distinguished from [its promoters], could reasonably be 
expected to benefit from the transaction"). The fact that only a handful of 
cases directly addresses the statutory "benefit" requirement is testament to 
the view that such matters are effectively off limits in the courts. See, e.g., 
Sullivan & Young, "The Proposed Michigan Corporation Act: Officers and 
Directors," 18 Wayne L. Rev. 951, 969 (1972) ("The prerequisite standard is 
obviously elastic; it is certainly doubtful that any court would challenge the 
determination by directors that a loan to a particular director-officer could rea-
sonably be expected to benefit the corporation"). 
22 See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re Mort-
gageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1268 (5th Cir. 1983) (creditor sues control-
ling shareholder of a corporation in chapter 7, asserting a right to recover from 
him personally under the "trust fund" doctrine; among the plaintiff's allega-
tions are that the defendant had caused the company to make various loans, to 
defendant and entities controlled by him, totaling $2.3 million); Robertson v. 
White. 633 F. Supp. 954, 960-961 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (general manager of in- 
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The success of the loan enabling statutes is evidenced by the 
widespread use of executive loans. 23 They commonly occur (as 
one might suspect) within closed corporations, often without re-
gard to corporate formalities. 24 They also occur in publicly held 
corporated agricultural cooperative secured board approval for low-interest. 
unsecured loans to his speculative personal business venture amounting to $3.8 
million: they also granted themselves no-interest loans; ultimately the co-op 
filed for reorganization under the bankruptcy act, the general manager was 
convicted of tax fraud, and the co-op members resorted to suit under the feder-
al securities laws); Levy v. Runnells (In re Landbank Eq. Corp.), 66 Bankr. 
949, 962 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (trustee's suit against controlling shareholders 
of a second mortgage company alleges loans to them and relatives totaling $1.6 
million plus foregone points totaling $629,344: court finds that the defendants 
"took, moved property around, favored themselves, and bled the company to 
death kw their own selves' sake. If exemplary damages are not here clearly 
proper, there has never existed a case where they were"): McLemore v. Olson 
in re 13&1. Labs., Inc.). 62 Bankr. 494, 505, 510 I Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) 
(suit by trustee in bankruptcy to pierce the corporate veil and recover losses 
from director/shareholders was successful, the court noting that defendants 
had "plundered the assets of 'the corporation]." leaving it with liabilities in 
excess of $2 million. by a variety of means, including making loans to directors 
and officers without formal shareholder approval). 
23 In a sampling of 152 corporations reporting to the SEC in 1987. 55, or 36.2 
percent, were found to have made material executive loans (those in excess of 
$60,000) during the preceding fiscal year. Barnard, note 2 supra, at text ac-
companying nn. 58-60. In a sampling of 44 corporations that went public in 
1986. 43.2 percent had made material executive loans in the 3 years preceding 
going public. Barnard, "Curbing Management Conflicts of Interest—The 
Search for an Effective Deterrent," 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 369 11988). 
24 See, e.g., Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., I Conn. App. 656, 660, 476 A.2d 584, 
587 (1984) (closed corporation's $10,000 loan to start-up business owned by 
directors' wives found to be "unfair" to the corporation and voided): Levin v. 
Levin, 43 Md. App. 380, 389, 405 A.2d 770. 777 (1977) (president of a closed 
corporation was shown to have "borrowed almost $100,000 from [the com-
pany]. drawing checks upon the corporate funds either to himself or in pay-
ment of personal obligations. He stated that the borrowings were without the 
knowledge or approval of the directors of the corporation [his wife and daugh-
ter] and without any form of corporate resolution or authority"): Speer v. 
Dighton Grain, Inc., 229 Kan. 272. 274, 276, 624 P.2d 952, 954, 955 (1981) 
(manager-director of closed corporation had "written some $87,000 in corpo-
rate checks to himself and had restored only a portion of that amount to the 
corporate account"; only after the auditors protested did he tender a $54,000 
unsecured note for the remaining balance); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 
Kan. 506, 518, 582 P.2d 1136, 1145-1146 (1978) (officers of closed corporation 
were found to have utilized corporate funds for payment of insurance pre-
miums on themselves and members of their families, excessive travel ex-
penses, and other personal expenses totaling $90,000; "during the course of 
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corporations, sometimes with embarrassing consequences or 
worse. 25 They are made to facilitate relocation, facilitate share 
purchases, and support a wide range of executive financial needs 
ranging from college tuition and unpaid tax liabilities to in-
vestments in private business ventures and coverage of margin 
calls . 26 
Few state statutes require any form of security for executive 
loans, 26a and the Delaware statute and its progeny 27 specifical-
ly provide that such loans may be made secured or unsecured as 
the trial, the defendants admitted some 100 payments had been made by error 
from the corporation or partnership but contended they were honest mistakes 
and defendants were willing to account for them"). 
25 During fiscal year 1985, in which Allegheny International, Inc., lost a rec-
ord $109 million, it made $32.3 million in loans to its officers and directors, 
repayable at a 2 percent rate of interest. Of this amount. $21.9 million was 
loaned for purposes of stock acquisition while $10.4 million was loaned "for 
other things." "Big Trouble at Allegheny, - Bus. Wk., Aug. 11, 1986, at 60. 
Press disclosures of these and other self-dealing transactions ultimately led to 
shareholder litigation alleging, among other things, that the loans represented a 
violation of prudent business operating procedures, waste, and mismanage-
ment (Complaint, Allegheny 1nel Inc. v. Haig, Dkt. No. 86-1648, ¶ 39 (W.D. 
Pa. 1987)) and to SEC enforcement proceedings. SEC v. Allegheny Intl Inc., 
Ling. Release No. 11533 (Sept. 9, 1987). 
LTV, Inc., during a year in which it lost $378.2 million and was forced to 
close its Pennsylvania manufacturing operations, made an interest-free loan of 
$965,250 to its chairman/CEO to enable him to exercise his stock options. One 
observer sneered that "he apparently had not been able to save enough on his 
annual salary of $743,315." Olasky, "The Public Relations Scams of 1985," 56 
Bus. & Soc'y Rev. 52 (1986). 
Horn & Hardart Company, which in 1986 lost $28.4 million and whose share 
value had dropped by more than half since 1983, in 1984 made (and later ex-
tended) a $100,000 "personal loan" to its executive vice president and a 
$154,700 loan to its vice chairman to permit his investment in a casino. "Why 
Didn't They Pay Him to Stay Home?" Forbes, June 15, 1987, at 120-121: 
Horn & Hardart Co. Proxy Statement, May 14, 1987, at 12. 
De Laurentiis Entertainment Group (DEG), whose stock sold at $12 in its 
initial public offering in 1986 and now sells at less than $1 per share, is re-
portedly $174 million in debt to banks, debenture holders, and trade creditors. 
Film distribution has been suspended. Nonetheless, DEG continues to hold 
outstanding unpaid notes from its CEO ($8.4 million) and from two of his in-
dependent business ventures ($27 million). "No, Thank You, Paine Webber," 
Forbes, March 7, 1988, at 52, 56. 
26 Barnard, note 2 supra, text accompanying nn. 58-60. 
26a But see S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-170. 
27 The states using the Delaware format include Florida, Kansas, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. 
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the directors see fit. 28 Therefore, judicial suggestions that unse-
cured loans to corporate executives are inherently "unfair" 29 
 are undoubtedly hyperbolic. By the same token, only one state 
statute makes any reference to the factors to be considered in 
"pricing" the loan, 29a and the Delaware statute expressly per-
mits corporations to make non-interest-bearing loans. 30 Here, 
however, there is a somewhat more compelling argument that 
executive loans made at below-market interest rates should be 
adjusted31 or at least carefully considered, particularly where the 
corporation itself is paying high rates of interest for its funds. 
This view has recently been reinforced by changes in federal tax 
law penalizing the use of below-market loans. 32 
Tax Treatment 
Until quite recently, federal tax law favored the use of execu-
tive loans in lieu of compensation. Specifically, employees in 
receipt of the loaned funds were not taxed as receiving income. 
Occasionally and particularly in the context of closed corpora-
tions, putative loans were deemed constructive dividends. 33 
28 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 143 (1983). 
28 Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 171, 174, 568 
P.2d 1069, 1072 (1977). 
29a  S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-170 (loans must be at prevailing rate for "quotes 
of like character"). 
30 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 143 (1983). 
31 See Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 
1133-1134, 435 N.E.2d 712, 722-723 (1982). See also Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 
154, 159, 420 A.2d 1078, 1080-1 (1980) (corporate loans to businesses wholly 
owned by the lending corporation's president at rates "substantially below the 
rate charged unrelated businesses" constitute grounds for an accounting in 
favor of minority shareholders); Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 339 
N.Y.S.2d 347, 356 (1972) (subsidiary corporation that loaned funds to its 97.2 
percent shareholder was entitled to "at least what [the borrower] would have 
had to pay an outsider to borrow the money"; this was held to include not only 
the applicable prime rate but also the value of compensating balances that 
would have been required by a bank lender and that would have increased the 
effective rate of interest); Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 
Ariz. at 174, 568 P.2d at 1072 ($150,000 loan to corporation's president, repay-
able at 4 percent, is unfair to the corporation given what would have been 
available to it in the money market). 
32 See notes 38-45 infra, and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., Busch v. Comm'r, 728 F.2d 945, 947-948 (7th Cir. 1984) (sole 
shareholder of corporation withdrew $300,000 and tendered non-interest-bear- 
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More frequently, however, executive loans were made bearing 
little or no interest, and neither the employer nor the executive 
experienced adverse tax consequences. 34 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) 35 began the trend 
toward reform of this practice, which was completed with the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86). 36 
First, Congress enacted Section 7872 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which recharacterized below-market loans" as arm's-
length transactions. In the case of corporate loans to executives, 
this resulted in the following: 
ing uncoliateralized notes; court finds no contemporaneous intent to repay, and 
treats the advances as constructive dividends); Dolese v. United States. 605 
F.2d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (court treats 
periodic withdrawals by sole shareholder cumulating to $1,817,133 as con-
structive dividends); Oyster-Shell Prods. Corp. v. Comm'r. 313 F.2d 449, 451 
(2d Cir. 1963) (shareholders of closely held corporation found to have received 
constructive dividends notwithstanding corporate records reflecting their in-
debtedness); Lewis v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414 (1985); Rapoport v. 
Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 205 (1983); Piekos v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1401 (1982); Pizzarelli v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 156 (1980); Smith v. 
Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 900 (1980); McLemore v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 259 (1974); Holman v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1973); Electric 
& Neon, Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1324 (1971), aff'd without opinion, 496 F.2d 
876 (5th Cir. 1974); Chesapeake Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1285, 
1292-1293 (1964). 
34 See generally Comment, "The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans," 61 Tul. 
L. Rev. 849, 849 n.2 (1987) ("[D]uring the blissful era from 1913-1984, the 
borrowers of interest-free loans enjoyed the tax-free use of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars"); Closius & Chapman, "Below Market Loans: From 
Abuse to Misuse—A Sports Illustration," 37 Case W. Res. U.L. Rev. 484, 485 
(1987) ("Because the Service's attempts to tax these loans had failed, employ-
ers began to utilize below market loans as compensation for employee ser-
vices. . . . Under widely accepted case law interpretation, [such loans) pro-
vided significant economic benefits to borrowers without generating reporting 
or tax liability"); Chvisuk, "Taxation of Loans Having Below-Market Interest 
Rates," 21 Idaho L. Rev. 257 (1985). 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did (and does) retain the right to impose 
on corporations making excessive executive loans an accumulated earnings 
tax. Reg. § 1.533-1(a)(2)(i), 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.533-1 (1987); 1.537-2(c)(1), 26 
C.F.R. § 1.537-2 (1987). 
35 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). 
36 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2223 (1986). 
37 Characterization of interest rates as "below market" was based, in the 
case of a demand loan, on the applicable federal rate (AFR) in effect as of the 
date the loan was made. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2); I.R.C. § 1274(d). 
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(1 ) [T]he lender [being] treated as if he [had' transferred 
foregone interest to the borrower in the form of compensation. 
(2) [T]he foregone interest [then being] treated as being re-
paid from the borrower to the lender. 
a. The lender includes foregone interest in income and 
takes a deduction for compensation paid. 
b. The borrower treats foregone interest as interest ac-
tually paid subject to the normal rules for deducting inter-
est 
c. The foregone interest is subject to FICA and FUTA 
taxes, and must be reported on Form W-2 as compensation. 
However, it is not subject to wage withholding. 38 
The timing of these taxable events depends on whether the loan 
is a demand loan or a term loan. 39 These imputation rules do not 
apply to loans aggregating less than $10,000. 40 Section 7872, as 
illuminated by frequently revised "temporary" regulations,'" re-
mains in effect. 
In 1986, Congress again revised the Code and (perhaps un-
intentionally)42 further circumscribed the favorable tax treat-
ment of certain executive loans, whether made at below-market 
interest rates or at competitive rates. Beginning with taxable 
year 1987 and becoming fully effective in 1990, 43 Congress ad-
vanced the proposition that interest paid or accrued when the 
character of the interest is "personal" should not be de-
ductible." 
The Code does not affirmatively define or describe what con-
stitutes "personal" interest. 45 Rather, Section 163(h) defines it 
38 Salzberg, "Executive Loans and 'Perks' After DEFRA," in Executive 
Compensation 1986, 45, 48-49 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Series, Tax 
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 239, 1986). 
39 Comment, note 34 supra, at 857. 
40 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(3); Salzberg. note 38 supra, at 49. 
41 Temp. Reg. § 1.7872-5T, 26 C.F.R. § 1.7872-5T (1987). 
42 Comment, note 34 supra, at 887. 
43 I.R.C. § 163(h)(6). 
44 Comment, note 34 supra, at 885; I.R.C. 163(h)(1). 
45 O'Connor, "The Tax Functions, Effects and Other Business Uses and 
Benefits of Debt Under the New Interest Deduction Rules and Tax Rates: 
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in the negative as including any interest expense not previously 
enumerated." The primary enumerated interest expenses—all 
of which are deductible in some form—include "investment in-
terest," 47 "trade or business interest," 48 "passive activity in-
terest,"" and "qualified residence interest." 50 
This configuration requires borrowers to trace the use of their 
loan proceeds to determine if the interest payments made (or, in 
the case of below-market loans, imputed) to the lender represent 
enumerated interest expenses (thus permitting the appropriate 
interest deduction) or a "personal" interest expense (thus ren-
dering their interest payments nondeductible). 
Therefore, where a corporation makes an executive loan, in 
the context of a company-ordered relocation or otherwise, to 
support the purchase of (and the loan is secured by) the borrow-
er's principal or secondary residence, the interest is fully de-
ductible pursuant to the "qualified residence interest" (QRI) 
provision of the Code.51 Loans made to support financial obliga-
tions incurred in the conduct of a trade or business invoke the 
"trade or business interest" provision, also permitting full de-
ductibility . 52  
Where the loan is made to facilitate share purchases, the inter-
est is deductible only to the extent allowed by the "investment 
interest" provision of the Code. 53 Interest paid on loans made to 
facilitate investment in a "passive activity," 54 such as owner- 
Some Guideposts Through the Mazes of the Code," 40th U. Chi. L. School 
Ann. Fed. Tax Conf., reprinted in Taxes, Dec. 1987, at 963. 
46 Id.; I.R.C. § 163(h)(2). 
47 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(B), incorporating by reference I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A). 
48 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A). 
49 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(C), incorporating by reference I.R.C. § 469. 
I.R.C. § I63(h)(2)(D), incorporating by reference I.R.C. §I63(h)(3). 
51  Id. The underlying debt may not exceed the fair market value of the 
taxpayer's qualified residence or residences. O'Connor, note 45 supra, at %I . 
52 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(C), incorporating by reference I.R.C. § 469. "Trade 
or business interest" does not include interest expense incurred in the trade or 
business of performing services as an employee." O'Connor, note 45 supra, at 
963; I.R.C. § 163(h). 
53 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(B), incorporating by reference I.R.C. 
§ I63(d)(3)(A). Investment interest is deductible only to the extent of net in-
vestment income for the year. O'Connor, note 45 supra, at 960, 963. 
54 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(C), incorporating by reference I.R.C. § 469. An 
activity is "passive" if it involves the conduct of any trade or business and the 
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ship of a commercial building," will be treated as a passive loss, 
deductible only to the extent of the taxpayer's passive activity 
income for the year." 
Loans made generally as compensation substitutes—to 
finance the purchase of automobiles, payment of tuition, 
"repayment of personal obligations," and the like—will be 
wholly nondeductible. 
Disclosure Requirements 
In companies subject to the oversight of the SEC, executive 
loans aggregating to $60,000 or more in a given year must be 
disclosed in both the Form 10-K annual filing and in the annual 
proxy solicitation. 57 Disclosure must include the borrower's 
name as well as the following information: 
[T]he nature of the person's relationship by reason of which 
such person's indebtedness is required to be described, the 
largest aggregate amount of indebtedness outstanding at any 
time during [the period since the beginning of the registrant's 
last] fiscal year, the nature of the indebtedness and of the 
transaction in which was incurred, the amount thereof out-
standing as of the latest practicable date and the rate of inter-
est paid or charged. . . . 58 
taxpayer doesn't materially participate in the activity. Stoner, "A Guide to the 
Passive Loss Rules," Fed. Taxes (CCH) ¶ 104 (Feb. 11, 1988). 
55 Passive activities presumptively include rental activities and limited part-
nership participations (Storrer, note 54 supra, at ¶ 104.2) but not working in-
terests in oil and gas production (id.). 
56 O'Connor, note 45 supra. at 962. Any unused loss deductions may be 
carried forward to be offset against the excess passive income, if any, in the 
following years. Any still-unused loss deductions will be analyzed on an activ-
ity-by-activity basis and will be allowed in full only in the year in which the 
taxpayer disposes of his entire interest in the activity. "Id. 57
 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1987), both incorporat-
ing by reference of Reg. S-K, Item 404(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987). 
58  Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987). Notwithstanding the language of 
the statute, the SEC staff has issued a number of interpretive letters permitting 
issuers to report executive loans in the aggregate rather than individually. 
"Proxy Statement Loan Disclosures," Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 7. 
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The disclosure need not include the purported "benefit" result-
ing to the corporation as a consequence of granting the loan." 
Only California requires disclosure of executive loans in an-
nual reports to shareholders," with the threshold of materiality 
at $40,000 rather than the $60,000 employed in the federal stat-
ute. 61 This requirement is imposed on California domiciliary cor-
porations with WO or more shareholders of record unless the 
companies already report to shareholders pursuant to SEC dis-
closure requirements" and also on any foreign corporation hav-
ing its principal executive office in California and customarily 
holding meetings of its board in California." 
Federal Reserve Limitations on Margin Loans 
The most common reason stated by public companies for 
making executive loans is to facilitate share purchases. 64 Execu-
tive loans made for this purpose may be governed by Regulation 
G of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System." 
Regulation G applies to the following: 
[P]ersons other than banks, brokers or dealers, who extend or 
maintain credit secured directly or indirectly by margin stock. 
. . . Credit extended by such persons [for the purpose of 
59 See Mann, note 1 supra, at 1306 ("There is a requirement. of course, that 
you disclose loans to management in excess of $10,000; but I don't read that as 
saying you disclose the rationale of the board in deciding to make the loan. 
There is no requirement of such qualitative information, and in reports filed 
under the Exchange Act. I've not gone on behind the requirements of the form 
to make the disclosure of the reason why the board has made the loan, and 
other details that the ethical investor might be concerned about"). 
60 Cal. Corp. Code § 1501 (West Supp. 1988). 
61 Cal. Corp. Code § 1501(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988). 
62 Cal. Corp. Code § 1501(b) (West Supp. 1988). 
63 Cal. Corp. Code § 1501(g) (West Supp. 1988). 
64 Barnard, note 2 supra, at text accompanying nn. 58-60. 
65 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-207.7 (1987). Regulation G is issued pursuant to 
Exchange Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982), which authorizes the Federal 
Reserve Board to promulgate rules governing "the amount of credit that may 
be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security." Corporate 
(or individual) lenders may be subject to the statute just as are brokers (gov-
erned by Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.18 (1987)) and banks (governed by 
Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-221.8 (1987)). 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1982). 
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facilitating the purchase of margin stock] is regulated by limit-
ing the loan value of the collateral securing the credit. . . . 66 
Assume that a corporation makes a loan to facilitate share 
purchases by its executives. In the absence of an "eligible [stock 
acquisition] plan," 67 the corporation as a Regulation G lender is 
limited to lending the Federal Reserve Board-defined "maxi-
mum loan value" of the margin stock to be acquired, 68 which 
currently is 50 percent of the stock's current market price. 69 Cor-
porations that have adopted an "eligible plan" 70 may lend up to 
the "good faith loan value" of the margin stock, 71 which may be 
as much as 100 percent of the current market price. In the case 
of stock option plans, the Regulation G lender may additionally 
66 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(b) (1987). "Margin stock" is broadly defined to include 
any equity security traded on a national securities exchange or in the OTC 
market. 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(i) (1987). "Indirectly secured" is defined as includ-
ing any arrangement with the borrower under which (1) the borrower's right or 
ability to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of margin stock is in any way re-
stricted while the credit remains outstanding or (2) the exercise of such right is 
or may be cause for accelerating the maturity of the credit. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 207.2(f)(1) (1987); Board Rulings and Staff Opinions Interpreting Regulation 
G—Indirectly Secured—Acceleration Clause Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 5-354. Mar-
gin stock is not directly or indirectly secured "if the lender, in good faith, has 
not relied upon the margin stock as collateral in extending or maintaining the 
credit." 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f)(2)(iv) (1987). 
67 See note 68 infra. 
68 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(b) (1987). 
69 12 C.F.R. § 207.7(a) (1987). See generally "Executive Compensation: A 
1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor," 43 Bus. Law. 234-235 (1987). 
"[P]uts, calls and combinations thereof have no loan value." 12 C.F.R. 
§ 207.7(c) (1987). 
70 This section includes "any employee stock option, purchase, or owner-
ship plan adopted by a corporation and approved by its stockholders that pro-
vides for the purchase of margin stock of the corporation, its subsidiaries, or 
affiliates." 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(a)(2) (1987). Note that shareholders are not re-
quired specifically to approve the credit features of the plan. Board Rulings and 
Staff Opinions Interpreting Regulation G—Employee Stock Option Plan—
Shareholder Approval of Credit Terms, Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 5-347.19 (Mar. 
12, 1984). 
71 "Good faith loan value" is defined as "that amount (not exceeding 100 
percent of the current market value of the collateral) which a lender, exercising 
sound credit judgment, would lend without regard to the customer's other 
assets held as collateral in connection with unrelated transactions." 12 C.F.R. 
§ 207.2(e) (1987). 
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loan funds sufficient to pay the income tax due upon the exercise 
of the option. 72 
Regulation G may apply not only to direct extensions of credit 
but also, under some circumstances, to corporate guarantees of 
bank loans made to facilitate the exercise of stock options. 73 The 
basic rule is that Regulation G lenders cannot "arrange for" the 
extension of credit by other lenders to an extent greater than the 
Regulation G lender could lend itself. 74 Regulation G does not 
apply to wholly unsecured loans, regardless of the use to which 
the borrower puts the proceeds, 75 nor to margin loans aggregat-
ing with respect to all borrowers less than $200,000. 76  
Regulation G lenders are required to register with the Federal 
Reserve within thirty days after the end of any calendar quarter 
during which the amount of margin credit extended equals 
$200,000 or more77 and to file annual reports. 78 
The statutory foundation for Regulation G provides that it 
shall not apply to loans made by a person "not in the ordinary 
course of his business." However, this language has been re-
cast in the regulation to encompass corporate loans "reasonably 
expected to occur in carrying out or furthering any business pur-
pose. . . ." 80 The Federal Reserve Board has construed this lan-
guage specifically to encompass the making of loans pursuant to 
stock option plans, 81 utilizing reasoning that would govern loans 
made to facilitate purchases of the lending company's shares 
even when they are made outside of such plans. 82 It is question-
able whether loans made to facilitate share purchases in compa-
nies other than the lender ought to be governed by Regulation G; 
72 Board Rulings and Staff Opinions Interpreting Regulation G—Employee 
Stock Option Plan—Tax Loans, Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 5-347.16 (Sept. 7, 1983), 
5-347.17 (Sept. 21, 1983). 
73 12 C.F.R. § 207.103 (1987). 
74 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(d) (1987). 
75 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f)(2)(iv) (1987). 
76 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(a)(1) (1987). The Federal Reserve Board has issued 
Questions and Answers on Regulation G through the Federal Reserve Regula-
tory Service. Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 5-321. 
77 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(a) (1987). 
78 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(o) (1987). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1982). 
80 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(g) (1987). 
81 12 C.F.R. § 207.103(e) (1987). 
82 The Federal Reserve Board has commented: 
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but, in any event, these loans may run afoul of the state law-im-
posed "corporate benefit" standard. 83 
Risks Inherent in Executive Lending 
Extension of credit to any borrower is an inherently risky un-
dertaking. Even after substantial deregulation, federal banking 
law continues to recognize the special risks presented by insider 
lending." Indeed, recent scholarly inquiry has identified the 
presence of executive loans as a "major warning sign that a bank 
may eventually fail." 85 This correlation is not a direct one in the 
sense that unrepaid insider loans are the primary cause of bank 
insolvency. Rather, the presence of these loans in excessive 
amounts reflects an overall management failure of control that is 
conducive to bank failure." A similar argument might be made 
about corporate lenders that made excessive executive loans. 
Certainly, corporate lenders can appropriate from con-
ventional lenders risk-reducing strategies, such as floating inter-
est rates, specific term lending, security agreements, protective 
covenants, and per-person and aggregate lending limits. Corpo-
rate lenders are well advised to articulate systematically the cir-
cumstances in which executive loans will be made rather than 
considering loan requests on an ad hoc basis. 87 
In general, stock option plans are designed to provide a company's em-
ployees with a proprietary interest in the company in the form of ownership 
of the company's stock. Such plans increase the company's ability to attract 
and retain able personnel and, accordingly, promote the interest of the com-
pany and its stockholders, while at the same time providing the company's 
employees with additional incentive to work toward the company's future 
success. An arrangement whereby participating employees may finance the 
exercise of their options ........designed to promote the company's in-
terest and is, therefore, in furtherance of a business purpose. 
12 C.F.R. § 207.103(e) (1987). 
83 See notes 9, 14-21 supra, and accompanying text. 
84 See Barnard, note 2 supra, at nn. 135-138. 
85 "Study Shows Insider Loans May Signal Failure," Am. Banker, July 9, 
1987. 
86 The study's authors found that "high insider borrowing banks" have high-
er loan losses, larger operating expenses, greater risk, lower returns on equity, 
and a greater failure rate than "low or medium borrowing banks." Kummer, 
Arshadi & Lawrence, Valuation Consequences of Bank Insider Borrowing 20 
(unpublished draft). 
87 For examples of corporate lending policies, see Barnard, note 2 supra, at 
n. 139. 
